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NOTES
AUTOMOBILES- IMPUTATION OF NEGLIGENCE UNDER
SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY STATUTES-AGENCY AND BAIL-
MENT THEORIES. The avowed purpose of safety responsibility stat-
utes is to impose financial liability for injuries to third persons upon
the owner of the automobile causing the injury. The theory upon
which liability is attached is that the negligence of the driver is imput-
ed to the owner. Imputation of negligence in suits by the third party
against the owner serves the purpose of the statute and no problem
arises, but where the owner sues the third party for damages to car or
person, the difficult question arises as to whether the defendant will be
allowed the defense of contributary negligence-arguing that there is
an imputation of negligence from the driver to owner.' The solution re-
solves on the narrow issue of whether the statute creates a bailment or
an agency between driver and owner-the general rule being that
there is no imputation in bailment cases while there is an imputation
in agency cases.2
The safety responsibility statutes provide a remedy for an injured
third person where at common law there was none.' Until 1897 con-
tributory negligence of a bailee was imputed to the bailor when the
latter sued for damages to the bailed article on the common law con-
cept of there being an inseparable identity of property interests be-
tween the bailor and bailee.' The modern concept is one of separate
property interests so that there is no imputation of negligence in the
absence of a relationship between the bailor and bailee which would
make the bailor liable to the third person as defendant.' The relation-
ship referred to is usually either that of a master-servant' or one of
joint enterprise'.
Adopting the modern view of property interests between bailor and
bailee the court held in Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co.' that the
Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406
(1943).
2 Prosser, Torts 417 (1941). Restatement, Torts § 485 (1934).
3 Without statutory declaration, a bailor is not liable to third persons for
harms caused by the negligent use of the bailment. Gardner v. Farnum,
230 Mass. 193, 119 N.W. 666 (1918); Slater v. Advance Thresher Co.,
97 Minn. 305, 107 N.W. 133 (1906).
Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Engl. Rep. 452 (1849).
New York L.E. & W. Ry. v. New Jersey Electric Ry., 60 N.J.L. 338, 38
Atl. 828 (1897); accord, Rodgers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 At. 166
(1931); Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 167 N.E. 762 (1929). Contra:
Munster v. Hexter, 295 S.W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Illinois Cent.
Ry. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325, 27 So. 527 (1900). Restatement, Torts § 489
(1934).
Prosser, Torts 471 (1941). See note, 8 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 100 (after
passage of Married Women's Act separating identity of wife and hus-
band, negligence was often imputed on the theory of one spouse being
agent of the other).
Prosser, Torts 418 (1941).
215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406 (1943).
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Minnesota statute' created a limited agency which did not impute
the negligence of the bailee to the bailor in a suit by the latter
against the third party for injuries to his automobile. The husband,
co-owner of the car with his wife and guilty of contributory negli-
gence in the collision, was alleged by his plaintiff-wife to be in con-
trol and custody of the car at all times, and driving the car with her
consent-she being his invitee." The defense was predicated on two
theories: that as a matter of law the relationship between the bailee
and bailor gave the latter a right of control upon which the negligence
was imputed, and that the safety responsibility statute imputed the
negligence so as to bar plaintiff's action. The first line of defense
failing,0 defendant argued that the statute created an agency between
bailor and bailee for all purposes. Rejecting the defendant's argument,
the court quoted with approval from a Rhode Island decision that,
"... the operator is not thereby made the agent of the owner with
all incidents of the law of principal and agent. The statute is intended
to be operative and to impose liability when there is an accident and
there is no existing agency."
The precise issue raised is whether the agency created by statute is
limited to suits by the third person so that no negligence can be im-
puted in a suit by the bailor. This issue is determined upon an analy-
sis of the statutes which fall into three general classifications:
(1) No question arises in the interpretation of the amended Califor-
nia statute which in addition to the usual provision that the owner
of a motor vehicle should be liable and responsible for the negligence
of another person driving the car in the business, or with the permis-
sion of the owner, provides that " . . . the negligence of such person
"'Whenever any motor vehicle . . shall be operated upon any public
street or highway of -this state, by any person other than the owner, with
the consent of the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall
in case of accident, be deemed the agent of the owner of such motor ve-
hicle in the operation thereof." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 170.54 (1946).
' If the owner is the guest of the operator of the car the owner can not be
imputed with the negligence of the operator unless they were engaged in
a joint enterprise or where the operator is the owner's servant or agent.
Sanjean v. Hyman, 302 Mass. 224, 19 N.W.2d 3 (1939).
' The court held that in the absence of a joint enterprise, the marriage re-
lationship between bailor and bailee does not at a matter of law create
an agency between them. Darian v. McGrath, 215 Minn. 389, 10 N.W.
2d 403 (1943); Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 167 N.E. 762 (1929).
Jacobsen v! Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949); see note,
11 A.L.R.2d 1429 (1950). Neither the marriage relationship nor the
fact that the car was being driven with the permission of the wife-owner
imputed negligence to the bailor. New York Telephone Co. v. Schofield,
31 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1941). Co-ownership does not impute negligence when
both husband and wife are in the car. Jenks v. Veeder Contracting Co.,
177 Misc. 240, 30 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1941). Owner's mere presence in car
will not preclude his recovery but is evidence of agency relationship or
joint enterprise. Johnson v. Newman, 168 Ark. 836, 271 S.W. 705 (1925);
Grover v. Sharp & Fellows Contracting Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 736, 153 P.
2d 83 (1944); cf. Restatement, Torts § 491, comment h (1934).
12 Kernan v. Webb, 50 R.I. 394, 148 Atd. 186 (1929).
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shall be imputed to the owner for all purposes of civil damages.""
(2) Statutes in the second classification are not so clear-cut and are
subject to divergent interpretations. Minnesota, Rhode Island, and the
District of Columbia have statutes providing that the operator shall
be deemed the "agent" of the bailor-owner."' Illustrative of the inter-
pretive split are Minnesota" and Rhode Island"9 holdings of no imputa-
tion of negligence under the statute and a contrary decision reached
in a District of Columbia court."7 (3) In the third classification are
statutes which merely provide that "the owner of the motor vehicle
shall be liable for the negligence of the driver."'" Demonstrating the
split in construing this class of statute are New York" and Michigan"0
decisions holding no imputation, with Iowa ' on the other side of the
fence.
Adopting legislative intent as the proper criterion for statutory in-
terpretation, the majority view that there is no imputation of negli-
gence in the latter two types of statute" as found in Minnesota and
New York becomes colored with logic and purpose. Without statu-
tory declaration, a bailor is not liable to third persons for injuries
caused by the negligent use of the bailed article." These latter sta-
tutes abrogate the common law rule that the negligence of a bailee
13 Cal. Veh. Code § 402 (1943). See, holding the amended statute was pro-
perly interpreted to include actions by the owner against the third per-
son so as to impute to the owner the negligence of the bailee, Milgate v.
Wrath, 19 Cal. 2d 297, 121 P.2d 10 (1942); Fox v. Schuster, 50 Cal.
App. 2d 362, 123 P.2d 56 (1942). See Idaho Code Ann. § 49,1004
(1948) for a similar unambiguous statute.
14 See note 9 supra for Minn. Statute; See R.I. Gen. Laws c. 98 § 10 (1938)
as amended R.I. Laws 1940, p. 476; D.C. Code § 40-403 (1940).
1z Christensen v. Hennepin Trans. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d. 406
(1943).
Id Kernan v. Webb., 50 R.I. 394, 148 Atl. 186 (1929).
17 National Trucking F2 Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 304 (Munic. Ct.
App. D.C. 1949).
New York Veh. & Traf. Law Art. 5, § 59 (1939). Iowa Code Ann.
§ 321.493 (1949).
Gochee v. Wagner, 232 App. Div. 401, 250 N.Y. Supp. 102 (4th Dep't
1931), holding no imputation of negligence to bailor. See 17 Corn. L.Q.
158 (1931) for excellent discussion of case. Mills v. Gabriel, 259 App.
Div. 60, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1940) holding that each owner could recover
against the other for damages to the car of the other, caused by the negli-
gence of the respective drivers on the theory that there was no imputa,
tion of negligence. Contra: Renza v. Brennan, 165 Misc. 96, 300 N.Y.
Supp. 221 (City Ct. 1937); Darrohn v. Russell, 154 Misc. 753, 277 N.Y.
Supp. 783 (City Ct. 1935).
20 Major v. Southwestern Motor Sales, 314 Mich. 122, 22 N.W.2d 96 (1946).
(no imputation of contributary negligence of husbanddriver to the injured
wife, a passenger); Ansaldi v. City of Detroit, 314 Mich. 73, 22 N.W.2d
77 (1946) (charge of imputation of driver's negligence to passenger-wife
is reversible error).
Secured Finance Co. v. Chicago, R.I. &Pac. Ry., 207 Iowa 1105, 224
N.W. 88 (1929) (negligence imputed to owner).
Note, 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 213, 214 (1934).
23 Restatement, Torts § 485, comments a, b (1934).
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is not imputable to his bailor for purposes of holding the bailor liable.-'
Yet they are silent on the precise issue. It follows that in the con-
struction of these remedial statutes there occurs a clash between two
rules of interpretation: (1) that all statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law are to be strictly construed; and (2) that a remedial statute
is to be given a liberal interpretation. The duty to interpret a remedial
statute liberally extends only to the point at which the evil sought
to be avoided is overcome, ' and with this as a yardsick it is evident
that the statute is to be liberally construed only in so far as it im-
poses financial liability for the driver's negligence on the bailor
consenting to such operation of his car.' Recognizing this truth, Judge
Sears, in the majority opinion of the Gochee case wrote with emphasis
that the statute ". . . is not to be wrenched out of its intended pur-
pose and its language distorted in order to conform it to the conven-
tional pattern of common law agency.' Investigation )f the "purpose"
reveals a legislative intent to reach three goals: (1) to prevent the
owner from escaping liability by claiming the driver was acting out-
side his scope of employment;' (2) to allow a financial recovery by
a damaged innocent third party;" (3) to increase highway safety by
motivating a more careful selection of drivers." Analysis discloses no
intent on the part of the legislature to protect the negligent third per-
son from a suit by the owner of the car-the intent of the law-makers
being focused on the sole purpose of germinating a right in the in-
jured third person. Supporting this analysis which precipitates into a
limited agency is the argument that a liability, and not an agency
was in reality created by the statute--the doctrine of respondeat
superior being chosen merely as a convenient "conduit" for effectuat-
ing the purpose."
A more convincing approach appealing to those unacquainted with
statutory interpretation and adhering to "curb stone equity" is found
in the bold fact that should the doctrine of contributory negligence be
given full application, a grossly negligent defendant-third person
could shield himself from a suit by the bailor-owner for damages by
merely using the defence of imputed negligence. No one could argue
"' Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 413, 116 N.E. 78, 80 (1917); Prosser, Torts
§ 66 (1941).
Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 349, 10 N.W.2d 406
(1943).
'While the statute is remedial, it is remedial solely in favor of an in-
jured third person." Gochee v. Wagner, 232 App. Div. 401, 250 N.Y.
Supp. 102, 105 (4th Dep't 1931).
250 N.Y. Supp. at 105.
Plaumbo v. Ryan, 213 App. Div. 517, 210 N.Y. Supp. 225 (2d Dep't
1925); Note, 20 Notre Dame Law. 160 (1944).
Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co., 215 Minn. 394, 10 N.W.2d 406
(1943); Cohen v. Neustadter, 257 N.Y. 207, 160 N.E. 12 (1928).
National Trucking & Storage Co. v. Driscoll, 64 A.2d 304 (Munic. Ct.
App. D.C. 1949); Note, 34 Minn. L Rev. 57 (1949).
3' Note, 17 Corn. L.Q. 158 at 164 (1931). The author, in discussing Gochee
v. Wagner, drew this sharp theoretical line of distinction.
92 Ballman v. Brinker, 211 Minn. 322, 1 N.W.2d 365 (1941).
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with conscience that this would be serving the purpose of the statute.
It has been stated that, " . . . the rule of comparative negligence
would serve justice more faithfully than that of contributory negli-
gence."" Prosser, affirms the injustice worked by an unexcepted ap-
plication of the rule and points out that it operates to place upon one
innocent party the entire burden of loss for which two are responsi-
ble.4
The minority argument that under the statutes negligence is imput-
ed in a suit by the bailor rests upon the sandy foundation of theoreti-
cal consistency. Under a statute similar to that of New York," Iowa
courts have held that the relationship of principal and agent is creat-
ed between the bailor and bailee." Justification for this result is
sought in reasoning identified as the "Two Way Rule": i.e., because
the statute imputes negligence to allow recovery by a damaged third
party, it also imputes any contributory negligence of the bailee to the
owner in a suit by the latter. The validity of this "rule" succumbs
to a broadside of logic that the reason for holding a consenting owner
responsible to an injured third person for the negligent operation of
his automobile is totally absent in an action by the owner for recov-
ery of damages sustained as a result of the concurrent negligence of
his operator and the injured. "It is a non sequitur to say that, because
the policy of the statute is to impose liability against the bailor, it
also is its policy to impute to him the contributory negligence of his
bailee."" An additional argument of the minority is that an illogical
result would flow from a situation where two bailees are contributor-
ily negligent and the owners sue each other for damages.' Not only is
this a very logical result of the application of the statute, but its policy
also bears fruit in that while the owner sustains the loss, the negligent
party does not escape liabiilty for damages to the owner's car. 9 Fur-
ther weakening the minority argument of "consistency" is the fact
that the concept of a split liability is not new, the majority of modern
cases holding no imputation of negligence so as to bar an action by the
33 Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 281 N.W. 261, 263
(1938).
3, Prosser, Torts 403 (1941). For supporting arguments see Padway, Com-
parative Negligence, 16 Marq. L. Rev. 3 (1931); Mole and Wilson,
A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 Corn. L.Q. 333, 604, 655 (1932)
("... only respect for its age can now be urged for its complete reten-
tion.")
:C Iowa Code Ann. § 321.493 (1949).
3" Secured Finance Co. v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., 207 Ia. 1105, 224 N.W.
88 (1929). Prosser, Torts § 66 n. 97 (1941).
'7 Christensen v. Hennepin Transp. Co. 215 Minn. 294, 10 N.W.2d 406
(1943). Maclntyre, The Rationale of Imputed Negligence, 5 U. of Tor-
onto L.J. 368, at 377 (1944) approves this criticism.
See 17 Corn. L.Q. 158 (1931), for an exacting review of the Gochee case.
3 Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949) (where a
double suit did arise).
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bailor against the third person; '  while in earlier cases negligence
was imputed in a suit by the bailor " but not when the third party
sued the owner.
4 2
It is important to note that liability under the statutes is gauged
in proportion to the consent of the bailor,4" so that an express limita-
tion of the bailment may relieve the bailor from liability and in ef-
fect negative the value of the procedural aid provided by the statute.4
It is submitted that the preservation of rights in the bailor given
by the interpretation of Minnesota and New York courts achieves the
purpose of the statute in providing only a limited armor from the
common law for the third person. Mesmerized by the logical appeal
of the "Two Way Rule," the minority courts have unwittingly blessed
the concurrently negligent defendant with an immunity from suit
which by accepted rules of statutory interpretation can not be justi-
fied.
Richard L. Healy
EVIDENCE-JURY TRIALS-WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE-CREDI-
BILITY OF WITNESSES--JUDICIAL COMMENT THEREON. Per-
haps the most heavily criticized factor in the administration of justice,
subject to vicious attack by both laymen and practitioners, is the
trial by jury. Arguments center not upon abolition of this constitu-
tionally established right but upon the obvious defects in its practical
results.
Among the many suggestions for improving this important aspect of
democratic justice is the granting of greater powers to the trial judge,
particularly permitting him to comment upon the weight of the evi-
dence and credibility of witnesses. Such a suggestion is neither new
nor untried, but has been a controversial question within our coun-
try for nearly 150 years.
HISTORICAL ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
No study of the problem of judicial comment may be adequately
undertaken without a thorough understanding of the political impli-
40 See Note, 6 A.L.R. 316 (1920) for recent cases illustrating the change
to the modern viewpoint taken by the courts after 1908.
Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484 (1859); Welty v. Indianapolis &
V. Ry., 105 Ind. 55, 4 N.E. 410 (1886).
12 Premier Motor Co. v. Tilford, 61 Ind. App. 164, .111 N.E. 645 (1916);
Pease v. Montgomery, 11 Me. 582, 88 AtI. 973 (1913).
4:, Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929); Stapleton
v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, 131 Misc. 52, 225 N.Y. Supp. 661 (Sup.
Ct. 1927).
44 Note, 17 Corn. L.Q. 158 at 161 (1931).
